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Abstract This chapter considers whether remunicipalisation – the return of water services 
to public ownership and management following the termination of private operating contracts 
– has a role to play in the future of the urban water sector. It does so by looking at the 
process of remunicipalisation in Berlin, Germany and Buenos Aires, Argentina. Attention is 
paid to the interplay of: 1) pendulum swings between competing paradigms of water service 
management; 2) the paradigm advocacy resulting in the dominance and emergence of 
paradigms at local level; and, 3) the conceptual tensions between communitarian and 
privatist paradigms of urban water management.  
 
In both cases, the rigidity of the privatist paradigm has led to the emergence of the 
communitarian paradigm. Two different processes of remunicipalisation are observed: 
explicit paradigm advocacy in Berlin, and tacit paradigm advocacy in Buenos Aires. In 
neither case has the passage from private to public ownership automatically led to the 
dominance of the communitarian paradigm. Indeed, the causal relationship between 
remunicipalisation and progressive change is not one of necessity but rather of possibility. 
Nonetheless, the emergence of water remunicipalisation as a global trend in the last 15 
years has profoundly reconfigured institutional trajectories in the urban water sector. The 
dominance of the privatist paradigm is now challenged in the global North and South and will 
continue to be in future. This is due to persistent demands by communities for water to be 
treated as a social good, and the shortcomings of water privatisation as a community 
development tool.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the global North and South, the urban water sector is at a crossroads and its institutional 
trajectories remain as uncertain as ever. For more than three decades, international 
organisations like the World Bank have relentlessly promoted water privatisation. This 
neoliberal project has been promoted in tandem with a number of national governments and 
the multinational corporations that stand to benefit from increased business opportunities 
(Lobina and Hall, 2009). The promotion of water privatisation has been underpinned by 
theories predicting ‘state failure’ (Bakker, 2013) and prescribing private sector management 
in view of superior private sector efficiency (Lobina, 2013). This theoretical armoury, also 
described as public choice ideology (Self, 1993), emboldened the World Bank to assert that 
‘there is no alternative’ to water privatisation (Hall and Lobina, 2009a: 82). Yet, 
developments in the last 15 years have exposed the intellectual fragility of this theoretical 
and ideological armoury and an increasing number of governmental authorities and local 
communities have refused to subscribe to the only alternative that they were offered under 
this neoliberal project. While the policy preferences of the World Bank and other mainstream 
actors remain unvaried, these developments are causing the redefinition of urban 
waterscapes. 
 
The first development is the failure of the academic community to find evidence of superior 
private sector efficiency (Bel et al., 2010), which exposes arguments of ‘state failure’ as a 
caricature of the public sector and a romanticisation of the private sector. The second 
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development is represented by the widespread social resistance against water privatisation 
(Hall et al., 2005; Lobina and Corporate Accountability International, 2014), which questions 
both the desirability and the feasibility of the neoliberal project. The third development is 
closely related to the first two and consists in the increasing termination and 
remunicipalisation of privatised contracts. The major cities that since 2000 have decided to 
close the book on water privatisation and remunicipalise water services by bringing them 
back under public control include Atlanta, USA; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Jakarta, 
Indonesia; La Paz, Bolivia; and the symbolically powerful case of Paris, France (Kishimoto, 
et al., 2015). Together with the fact that the overwhelming majority of the world’s cities are 
served by public water operators (Lobina and Hall, 2008), the emergence of water 
remunicipalisation as a global trend (Lobina, 2015) is upsetting neoliberal plans to turn 
privatisation into the globally dominant form of water service provision. 
 
Water remunicipalisation consists in the return of urban water services to public ownership 
and management following the termination of private operating contracts. It also represents 
a new form of water service provision that goes beyond ownership change to incorporate 
collective aspirations for social and environmental justice and offer new possibilities for 
creating progressive water policies (Lobina, 2015). Increasingly, cases of water 
remunicipalisation are associated with progressive change including improved access and 
service quality, and enhanced democratic governance (Lobina et al., 2014). In addition, the 
public sector has historically made a decisive contribution to the universalisation of access to 
water services in the global North (Hall and Lobina, 2009b) and the expansion and 
strengthening of water service provision in countries of the global South such as Brazil and 
Argentina (Castro and Heller, 2007). These precedents bode well for the potential 
contribution of water remunicipalisation to progressive change. Therefore, understanding the 
process of water remunicipalisation is of high policy relevance and instrumental to charting 
trajectories of institutional reform in the urban water sector.  
 
This chapter is concerned with the process of remunicipalisation as a paradigmatic policy 
change (Hall et al., 2013) and aims to ascertain whether remunicipalisation has a role to play 
in the future of the urban water sector. While Hall et al. (2013) predict institutional 
trajectories towards remunicipalisation by focusing on the macro-dimension of urban water 
reform in two northern countries, this chapter does so by looking at its micro-dimension in a 
northern and a southern city. To broaden the representativeness of the case studies, the 
chapter looks at one case of remunicipalisation in the global South (Buenos Aires, 
Argentina) and another in the global North (Berlin, Germany). Both cases explore the 
tensions between paradigms of water service management leading to and following the 
implementation of remunicipalisation.    
 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section outlines the main policy paradigms in 
water service provision. The third section contains an overview of extant research on water 
remunicipalisation as an emerging global trend, and serves as background for analysis. 
Particularly useful here are the observation of the extent and acceleration of the international 
diffusion of water remunicipalisation. The fourth and fifth sections present the two case 
studies. In the concluding section, the similarities identified between the process of 
remunicipalisation in Berlin and that in Buenos Aires allow for confirming some of the 
findings of Hall et al. (2013) and for qualifying others. In turn, this allows us to suggest new 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Paradigms of Water Service Management 
 
This chapter is concerned with the social forces and factors that underpin the process of 
remunicipalisation, to consider whether policy advocacy will be conducive to the expansion 
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of remunicipalisation in the future. Events leading to water remunicipalisation in the chosen 
case studies are interpreted with the aid of a framework that consists of: 1) Polanyian 
pendulum swings between competing paradigms of water service management, occurring at 
global level as a result of policy diffusion (Hall et al., 2013); and, 2) the paradigm advocacy, 
or the collective action and discourse resulting in the dominance and emergence of 
paradigms at local level (Lobina, 2012).  
   
As conceptual benchmarks for the orientation of institutional change in the pursuit of 
sustainable water development, urban water management paradigms can be defined in 
function of the principles that inform the ethos of water service operators (Lobina, 2012). The 
communitarian paradigm conceives water as a public or common good and access to water 
as a human right. It also upholds community development and social equity as the ultimate 
goals of water service provision, whether this is pursued through state or community 
involvement. This paradigm advocates the subsidisation of water pricing to favour universal 
service access. The neoliberal or privatist paradigm views water as an economic good or a 
commodity and rests on the centrality of the market as a regulating mechanism, of water 
privatisation as a form of delivery, of efficiency as the goal of provision, and full cost pricing 
as a financial mechanism (Castro, forthcoming, 2015, 2009; Bakker, 2008, 2007). Therefore, 
the communitarian and privatist paradigms are incompatible because they rest on two 
opposite conceptions of the nature of water service provision, respectively considering water 
as a public good and a commodity. The two paradigms also rest on two opposite 
conceptions of the means of water service provision, respectively emphasising the 
deployment of collective and individual property rights for the organisation of service delivery 
(Bakker, 2008). 
 
Drawing on Hall et al. (2013) and Lobina (2012), it is possible to summarise the analytical 
framework thus. The process of water remunicipalisation unfolds at the intersection of 
pendulum swings and paradigm advocacy. At the global level, pendulum swings between 
the communitarian and the privatist paradigm shape the normative environment for 
reforming water services. Local governance, collective action and governmental decisions 
on water service reform and ownership change are in fact influenced by the dominant 
paradigms produced by such pendulum swings. Policy diffusion mechanisms such as 
emulation and coercion represent a vehicle for the transmission of influence from global to 
local governance systems. At local level, actors form advocacy coalitions to reform local 
water services in reaction to the pendulum swings resulting from the international experience 
with water service reforms. Advocacy coalitions thus promote competing paradigms of water 
service provision. The conceptual tensions between the communitarian and the privatist 
paradigm, reflecting the tensions between irreconcilable ideas of water service provision, 
inform paradigm advocacy. The persistence of these tensions means that the problem of 
who and how should provide water services can only be reinterpreted but not solved 
(Lobina, forthcoming, 2015), so that the pendulum cannot be expected to cease swinging 
(Hall et al, 2013).     
 
3. The Emergence of Remunicipalisation as a New Form of Water 
Service Delivery 
 
In the last 15 years, water remunicipalisation has emerged as a global trend. Kishimoto et al. 
(2015) identify 235 cases of water remunicipalisation that occurred in 37 countries from 
March 2000 to March 2015. Water remunicipalisation is diffusing across high-income, 
middle-income, and low-income countries, albeit to different degrees and at varying 
velocities. The remunicipalisation trend shows a marked acceleration in high-income 
countries where 55 cases occurred between 2005 and 2009 and 104 cases took place 
between 2010 and early 2015, nearly doubling the pace of remunicipalisation in the global 
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North (Lobina, 2015). The observation of the remunicipalisation trend in selected European 
countries has induced more than one observer to refer to an on-going pendulum swing in 
favour of public versus private water operations (Wollmann, 2013; Hall et al., 2013). 
However, it is the list of major cities that in different geopolitical contexts have decided to 
remunicipalise water services since 2000 that better suggests the importance of this 
emerging trend. This list includes: Accra, Ghana; Almaty, Kazakhstan; Antalya, Turkey; 
Atlanta, USA; Bamako, Mali; Berlin, Germany; Bogota, Colombia; Buenos Aires, Argentina; 
Budapest, Hungary; Conakry, Guinea; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Jakarta, Indonesia; 
Johannesburg, South Africa; Kampala, Uganda; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; La Paz, Bolivia; 
Maputo, Mozambique; Paris, France; Rabat, Morocco (Lobina, 2015).   
 
To appreciate the significance of the global remunicipalisation trend for the possible 
institutional trajectories of the global water sector, the above data require contextualization. 
First, the global remunicipalisation trend is happening despite the considerable resources 
that international financial institutions have produced since the 1990s to promote the 
diffusion of water privatisation, and despite renewed initiatives to promote water privatisation 
(Lobina et al., 2014). Second, the fact that so many flagship privatisations of the 1990s have 
failed and have been prematurely terminated and remunicipalised points to the 
unsustainability of water privatisation. Third, these developments are at the same time 
redefining urban waterscapes, and opening the prospect for future changes in urban 
waterscapes. Decision makers are in fact questioning the credibility of water privatisation, 
especially in light of the symbolically powerful remunicipalisation in Paris (Pigeon, 2012), as 
recently acknowledged by French water multinationals (Lobina and Corporate Accountability 
International, 2014). 
 
Both in the global North and South, remunicipalisation is diffusing more rapidly in countries 
where water services have been previously privatised more extensively. This is the case in 
France where there have been 94 cases of water remunicipalisation from 2000 to 2015, with 
an acceleration that is unparalleled anywhere else in the world. This is also the case in 
Argentina, one of the countries of the global South that privatised most extensively in the 
1990s, and where there have been eight cases of water remunicipalisation from 2000 to 
2015 (Kishimoto, et al., 2015). The relatively limited diffusion of remunicipalisation in 
countries like Germany compared to France can be explained by the fact that, like in the rest 
of Europe and the rest of the world (Lobina and Hall, 2008), privatisation concerns only a 
minority of water operations. This narrows the opportunity for remunicipalisation. 
 
The drivers for remunicipalisation often include civil societal and local governmental 
discontent with privatisation. This discontent stems in large part from the private sector’s 
failure to meet theoretical expectations of superior efficiency and deliver on its promises to 
enhance sustainable water development. The false promises of water privatisation that have 
led to remunicipalisation include: poor operational performance of private companies (e.g. in 
Dar es Salaam, Accra, Maputo), under-investment (e.g. Berlin, Buenos Aires), disputes over 
operational costs and price increases (e.g. Almaty, Cochabamba, Maputo), soaring water 
bills (e.g. Berlin, Kuala Lumpur), difficulties in monitoring private operators (e.g. Atlanta), 
lack of financial transparency (e.g. Grenoble, Paris, Berlin), workforce cuts and poor service 
quality (e.g. Atlanta) (Lobina et al., 2014). In many cases, both in the global North and 
South, social mobilisation led to local governmental decisions to terminate unsatisfactory 
private contracts and remunicipalise water operations (Hall et al., 2005; Lobina et al., 2014). 
 
What makes water remunicipalisation a new form of public service delivery beyond 
ownership change are the aspirations for social and environmental justice that inform social 
mobilisation and collective demands for the return to public services, and the opportunities 
that remunicipalisation offers for innovative and emancipatory urban water trajectories. 
These opportunities are for the adoption by public service providers of institutional and 
operational policies consistent with the communitarian paradigm. For example, 
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remunicipalisation has led to the introduction of advanced forms of public participation in 
decision making – with civil society representatives sitting on the Board of Directors of the 
new public water operators – both in Grenoble (Lobina and Hall, 2007a) and Paris, France. 
In Paris, efficiency savings obtained after remunicipalisation allowed the new public 
enterprise to reduce tariffs, increase financial contributions to poor households, launch a 
water saving campaign, and refrain from cutting off water supply in squats (Sinaï, 2013; 
Pigeon, 2012). However, the policy process of remunicipalisation can be characterised by 
tensions between competing paradigms. In Jakarta, Indonesia, a civic campaign has 
demanded the remunicipalisation of a water concession and used a citizen lawsuit evoking 
the respect of the human right to water to achieve this aim (Zamzami and Ardhianie, 2015). 
These aspirations for collective ownership to realise collective civil rights, consistent with the 
communitarian paradigm, have been met with a governmental proposal to corporatise and 
part-privatise the local water operator, a proposal inspired by the privatist paradigm 
(Jacobson, 2014). To explore similar tensions between paradigms, the chapter proceeds by 
looking at the remunicipalisation processes in Berlin and Buenos Aires.  
 
4. Water Remunicipalisation in Berlin, Germany 
 
Preparations for the privatization of Berlinwasser (BWB), Berlin’s water operator, started with 
its commercialization in 1994 when the Senate of the city-state of Berlin decided to 
restructure the public company under private law. The Senate of Berlin then decided to 
privatise BWB by selling part of its capital (Lanz and Eitner, 2005). This initiative was 
motivated by the prospect of turning BWB into a company making profits for its public 
owners by operating international contracts. Eventually, the Senate of Berlin decided to 
privatise BWB by selling part of its capital to the private sector. This decision was presented 
as ‘a necessity in the face of rising city debts’ and as an opportunity to make BWB an 
important commercial player in the global water market (Beveridge, 2012: 56). The 
inevitability of the partial privatisation of BWB was accepted by most political parties 
represented in the Senate (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014).   
 
The decision to privatise BWB occurred in an economic and fiscal context shaped by the fall 
of the Berlin wall in 1989. In fact, this had led to the collapse of previously subsidised 
industries in both parts of Berlin and to widespread job losses in the public sector, causing 
mounting debts for the local government. Also, the decision to privatise was made in a 
historical moment when the promises of commercialisation, privatisation and globalisation 
were uncritically discussed (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014). In the 1990s, the pendulum 
was widely believed to be swinging in favour of water privatisation (Wollmann, 2013). The 
dominance of the privatist paradigm at local level was thus facilitated by the influence of 
pendulum swings and by policy diffusion in the form of emulation or, more precisely, 
conformity with the prevailing norms of behaviour.      
 
In 1999, 49.9% of the shares of BWB were sold to a consortium including multinationals 
RWE and Veolia. The agreement provided for a return on equity for the private shareholders 
to be eight per cent, and this level of profitability would be guaranteed by the state of Berlin 
for 28 years. The private contract was highly controversial as it led to ‘severe under-
investment’ and the explosion of prices (Händel, 2013; Lanz and Eitner, 2005). These 
arrangements were consistent with the privatist paradigm and its uncompromising belief in 
water as an economic good to be fully costed, and on the centrality of the market as a 
regulating mechanism needed to achieve efficiency. Another practice consistent with the 
privatist paradigm as well as the interests of the private shareholders was keeping the 
private contracts commercially confidential so that the favourable treatment of private sector 
interests could not be challenged by public opinion (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014).  
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The controversy surrounding the private contract, fuelled by dramatic price increases, 
favoured social mobilisation against water privatisation. In 2007, the citizens’ group Berliner 
Wassertisch (Berlin Water Table) started campaigning for the disclosure of the confidential 
contracts, and obtained the support of environmental groups and other social movements. 
Frustrated with the left-wing city government’s acceptance of water privatisation, the 
campaigners decided to use a public referendum to force the Senate to amend legislation 
and publish the secret contracts. The Senate responded by engaging in a legal standoff with 
the campaigners to prevent the referendum from taking place (Beveridge and Naumann, 
2014). Nonetheless, in February 2011, over 660,000 Berliners voted in favour of the 
proposition ‘Berliners want their water back’ turning the popular referendum into a triumph 
for the campaigners (Terhorst, 2014). The referendum had made the private contracts so 
unpopular that, in the city elections of September 2011, remunicipalisation ‘was in the 
manifesto of three of the four major political parties, despite the fact that Berlin still [had] 
huge debts’ (Beveridge, et al., 2014: 66). The contract was terminated as the state of Berlin 
bought back the shares owned by RWE in April 2012, and the shares owned by Veolia in 
September 2013 (European Water Movement, 2013).  
 
The aim of the referendum was not confined to the mere publication of the private contracts 
but included remunicipalisation. Drawn by the Berlin Water Table, the charter on the 
management of the remunicipalised BWB shows that the campaign for remunicipalisation in 
Berlin had been inspired by the communitarian paradigm. The Berlin Water Charter states 
that BWB must serve the common good, universal access to water in Berlin should be 
guaranteed as a human right, water should be affordable for all Berliners, and direct 
democratic participation in BWB’s decision making should be guaranteed (Berliner 
Wassertisch, 2013). However successful the referendum campaign in promoting BWB’s 
remunicipalisation, other factors might have played a role in orienting public opinion and 
ultimately governmental decision making in favour of public ownership. For example, policy 
diffusion and the emulation of Potsdam and other German cities that had previously 
remunicipalised water services also proved influential (Beveridge and Naumann, 2014).     
 
The tensions between the communitarian paradigm, as enshrined in the Berlin Water Table, 
and the privatist paradigm that informed the conduct of the privatised BWB are apparent. 
Testament to these tensions is the rejection by the Berlin Water Table of any form of future 
privatisation or part-privatisation of water operations, ‘not even in the context of so-called 
public-private partnerships or similar models’ (Berliner Wassertisch, 2013: 2). But the 
tensions between the two competing paradigms remain, even after remunicipalisation, as 
the effects of privatisation continue to be felt. On the one hand, the total cost to taxpayers of 
the acquisition of BWB’s private shares was EURO 1.3 billion ‘which [would] be paid for 
through higher water bills over the next 30 years.’ This financial burden casts doubt on the 
sustainability of water operations after remunicipalisation (Lobina et al., 2014: 8) threatening 
to undermine the aspirations of the Berlin Water Table for affordable and socially equitable 
charges. In this sense, the implications of a 2014 decision by Germany’s Federal Cartel 
Authority to impose a 17% price reduction and force BWB to pay EURO 254 million back to 
consumers1 remain to be seen. On the other hand, the remunicipalised BWB has rejected 
calls for introducing advanced forms of public participation and has established a 
consultative consumer council2 much in line with the practice of private water operators 
(Lobina and Hall, 2007a). As the remunicipalisation process consolidates, these tensions 
between competing paradigms appear unlikely to be solved in the near future.         
 
                                                 
1 Email communication from Carsten Herzberg, 11 April, 2015. For further details, see:  
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/DE/Pressemitteilungen/2012/05_06_2012_Wa
sser-Berlin.html;jsessionid=A4390F5E224B8CFE9D8E2F395DE6CCB6.1_cid387?nn=3591568. 
2 See http://www.bwb.de/content/language1/html/14273.php. I owe this insight to Carsten Herzberg.  
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5. Water Remunicipalisation in Buenos Aires, Argentina 
 
Preparations for the privatisation of water services in Buenos Aires began immediately after 
the election of Carlos Menem as President of Argentina in 1989. Menem implemented an 
extensive programme of privatisation as his administration declared a state of economic 
emergency justified by rampant hyperinflation. The decision to privatise water supply and 
sewerage in Buenos Aires was made by decree, without public consultation, and no 
alternatives to privatisation were discussed. The Argentinean Government was the leading 
actor in the advocacy coalition that promoted water privatisation. Other actors joined the 
coalition to support the implementation of the privatisation. The World Bank provided 
technical assistance and advice on selecting the concessionaire and the World Bank’s 
International Finance Corporation later became a minority shareholder of the private 
operator Aguas Argentinas. Offered a 10% shareholding in Aguas Argentinas, the main 
trade unions assuaged their resistance and, convinced of the inevitability of privatisation, 
turned into supporters of water privatisation. Public opinion was conquered by the 
governmental discourse that privatisation was the necessary cure for hyper-inflation and that 
there was no alternative to it (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).          
 
The neoliberal paradigm therefore became dominant as the macroeconomic crisis restricted 
the range of policy options that public opinion considered as realistic. Policy emulation 
contributed to reinforce the dominance of the privatist paradigm. For example, the World 
Bank-funded team of legal and financial consultants who assisted the privatisation process 
was UK-based (Loftus and McDonald, 2001). They could thus draw on the experience of the 
1989 water privatisation in England and Wales, an example that influenced the emergence 
of the privatist paradigm elsewhere (Lobina, 2005b). But the dominance of the privatist 
paradigm in Buenos Aires can also be explained by the latency of the communitarian 
paradigm in collective discourse in a context of anaesthetised dissent. Social mobilisation 
failed to challenge the dominance of the privatist paradigm even as private water operations 
generated increasing controversy (Loftus and McDonald, 2001).     
 
In May 1993, a consortium led by Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux started operating the Aguas 
Argentinas concession. It was only eight months later that Aguas Argentinas requested to 
renegotiate the contract, beginning a pattern of escalating bills, under-investment and 
considerable profits. This pattern would persist until the collapse of the Argentine economy 
following the financial crisis of December 2001 (Azpiazu and Forcinito, 2002; Lobina, 
2005a). Throughout this period, the profitability of the concession was prioritised over the 
achievement of social objectives. Network connections that proved unaffordable as a result 
of full cost pricing (Loftus and McDonald, 2001) were financed through a solidarity tax on all 
consumers, with little contribution from the private operator or external finance. In addition, 
network connections in peri-urban areas were financed through a community contribution of 
labour and a municipal contribution of materials. Finally, to guarantee the remuneration of 
international shareholders, water charges were indexed to the US Dollar so that currency 
devaluation risk was transferred to local consumers (Hall and Lobina, 2007; Lobina, 2005a).     
 
The December 2001 crisis was followed by years of legal confrontations between the 
concessionaire and the Argentine government. Aguas Argentinas’ insistence on increasing 
water prices to compensate for the 2001 devaluation of the local currency conflicted with 
governmental requests for tariff reductions to avoid exacerbating the social and economic 
crisis (Lobina and Hall, 2007b). In 2006, the government cancelled the concession contract 
and remunicipalised water and sanitation services by appointing the public operator AySA. 
Despite the change from private to public ownership, AySA was 10% owned by trade unions 
like Aguas Argentinas used to be. Also like its private predecessor, AySA involved residents 
in expanding water access in low-income neighbourhoods (Azpiazu and Castro, 2012). 
Conversely, the practice of financing investments in the extension of the service changed 
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following remunicipalisation. In October 2006, a long term investment plan of 5.69 billion US 
Dollars was approved to achieve full service coverage, 52% of which was to be financed 
through tariffs and the remaining 48% by the central and local governments (Lobina & Hall, 
2007b).   
 
In the absence of prominent social mobilisation for remunicipalisation, the communitarian 
paradigm emerged in the wake of the December 2001 crisis as the Argentinean government 
refused to accept that the profit motive takes precedence over social considerations 
(Azpiazu and Castro, 2012).  A practice associated with the communitarian paradigm that 
has been introduced with remunicipalisation is the use of public finance to enhance 
affordability and service access (Lobina & Hall, 2007b). This contrasts with the reliance on 
full cost recovery through tariffs and charges typical of the privatist paradigm as embodied 
by the Aguas Argentinas concession. However, elements of the two paradigms appear to 
coexist under the new public operations. The 10% shareholding held by the trade unions in 
AySA is a marketised form of workers’ participation in the workplace. Like the continued 
involvement of residents in the extension of network connections in peri-urban areas, this is 
proof of the lasting influence of privatisation. It is however not necessarily in contrast with the 
achievement of progressive change under remunicipalisation. Indeed, the fact that the public 
sector is not subject to the profit maximisation imperative allows for flexibility in allocating 
resources for achieving sustainable water development (Lobina, 2013).              
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The two case studies presented in this chapter show how, operating at the macro-level of 
paradigmatic policy change, pendulum swings and policy diffusion provide the stimulus for 
paradigm advocacy at the micro-level of urban water reform. This exogenous stimulus has 
been illustrated in relation to opposite types of reform, privatisation and remunicipalisation, 
whose implementation is informed by paradigms that embrace irreconcilable notions of 
water service provision: the notion of water as a public good and a human right enshrined in 
the communitarian paradigm, and the notion of water as a commodity which characterises 
the privatist paradigm.  
 
In both cases, the pendulum swing in favour of the privatist paradigm was favoured by a 
strong sense amongst policy participants of the inevitability of water privatisation. Also, the 
rigidity of the privatist paradigm and its unsuitability to address sustainable water 
development objectives has led to the emergence of the communitarian paradigm. This was 
accompanied by two different processes of remunicipalisation: explicit paradigm advocacy in 
Berlin, and tacit paradigm advocacy in Buenos Aires. In Berlin, an explicit advocacy coalition 
was formed between the Berlin Water Table and the social movements that supported the 
local referendum. In Buenos Aires, the Argentine government acted in conformity with the 
communitarian paradigm without engaging in concerted collective action. These different 
processes have one commonality: they are explained by the irreconcilability of ideas of 
community development and the profit motive that is the cornerstone of the privatist 
paradigm. 
 
Both in Berlin and Buenos Aires, doubts can be raised as to whether the passage from 
private to public ownership automatically led to the dominance of the communitarian 
paradigm. Indeed, the persistence of operational practices associated with the privatist 
paradigm points to a non-linear relationship of causality between the process and outcome 
of remunicipalisation. Otherwise put, the relationship between remunicipalisation and 
progressive change is not one of necessity but rather of possibility. The aim of this chapter is 
not to assess the outcome of water remunicipalisation, nor the result of path dependency in 
paradigmatic policy change. This is deferred to future work.          
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What the cases discussed here show is that, due to the rigidity of private operators in 
prioritising the profit motive over community development, social groups that uphold the 
communitarian paradigm and the idea of water as a human right will continue to mobilise 
against water privatisation. In addition, governments that recognise the unsuitability of 
privatisation to achieve ambitious sustainable water development objectives will continue to 
consider remunicipalisation as a credible policy option. The emergence of water 
remunicipalisation as a global trend in the last 15 years has profoundly reconfigured 
institutional trajectories in the urban water sector. The dominance of the privatist paradigm is 
now challenged in the global North and South and will continue to be in future. This is due to 
a combination of persistent demands by communities for water to be treated as a social 
good, and the shortcomings of water privatisation as a community development tool.       
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